Introduction: Selecting the Past and Transmitting the Truth by Pye Michael
The Eastern Buddhist 45/1&2: 1–10
©2016 The Eastern Buddhist Society
Feature:
transmission and Legitimation in 
Buddhist traditions
Introduction: Selecting the Past and 
Transmitting the Truth
michaeL Pye
the Present issue of The Eastern Buddhist carries a number of articles which in various ways relate to the special theme of “transmission and 
legitimation in Buddhist traditions.”
The religion which has come to be known as “Buddhism” is like a huge 
river with many substreams and distributaries. The representatives of vari­
ous schools and divisions usually treat each other with great respect. At the 
same time, eager and sometimes passionate debate among Buddhists has 
frequently been known. Differences and divergences from a particular line 
of teaching that claims authority have been deplored and the use of terms 
equivalent to “heresy” has not been unknown. Occasionally there have 
even been violent encounters. In modern times, the claim to be “Buddhist” 
has some times been asserted by leaders of new religions who are mainly 
teaching some thing very different but like to use such a respectable label. 
But who is to decide what is authentic? Who is to decide which forms of 
teaching are reliable? Who is to decide which presentations of Buddhism 
most clearly and faithfully reflect the original message of “the Buddha,” if 
indeed that can be identified at all after all the variations which have been 
proclaimed in his name?
Though this whole subject may seem irksome in some quarters, especially 
where there is a simple, almost fundamentalist acceptance of the authority 
of a great leader or a single sutra, it will no doubt continue to be a matter for 
reflection on the part of others, whether Buddhist or not. What we may often 
observe in the case of religions other than Buddhism is that the apparently 
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unambiguous choice of one authority actually masks deep conflicts. In 
the case of Islam, for example, although it is believed that there is but one 
sacred book, with an unaltered and unalterable Arabic text, and just one final 
messenger who completes the sequence of the many prophets who preceded 
him, what we observe is that the Sunni and Shiite factions are deeply 
divided from each other and are currently engaged in bitter warfare. This 
is reminiscent of the various wars of religion which were waged in Europe 
as a result of the polarization of the Catholic and Reformed (Protestant) 
traditions and the ways in which these were caught up in the political power 
struggles relating to the emergence of modern states. Yet it should not be 
simplistically thought, or taught, that such conflicts are the result of the 
effects of “monotheism,” as if this alone leads to the exclusion of others and 
hostility towards them. The Japanese religion Shintō, clearly polytheistic, 
has been used as a powerful engine for the political self­assertion of a single 
nation over others. In the case of Bud dhism it is also too simplistic to say 
that this is a pacific religion which could never get involved in physical or 
military conflicts. However, the question of the use, or misuse, of “religion” 
as a political weapon is not precisely the present subject. It is simply another 
example of how the question as to what is authentic in any particular case 
gets thrown up again and again.
If the convenient term “Buddhism” is sometimes regarded with slight 
concern, this is because there are so many different views about what “Bud­
dhism” might be. There seems to be a legitimate question about how we 
know whether a particular individual, group, school, or denomination is 
indeed Buddhist. The simple answer, notably proposed by anthropologists, 
is that if someone says they are “Buddhist” then they are Buddhist. Yet 
this answer is too simple, because sometimes such a claim is made for 
presen tational purposes, for example by a new religion, even though 
it has little substance. Such examples cannot be overlooked. Even for 
observers, therefore, caution is required when thinking about the question 
of “Buddhist” identity, which does not go away and cannot simply be 
shrugged off. For Buddhists themselves, the matter is more complex. In 
spite of a broad consensus of toleration between existent Buddhist groups, 
it is not uncommon to come across cases where teachings are considered to 
diverge significantly, either from “what the Buddha taught” (an orthodoxy) 
or from a particular, carefully developed line of interpretation which has 
produced spiritual fruit and stood the test of time (an orthopraxy). 
For example, devotion to or reliance on Amida Buddha is widespread 
across East Asia, so that we may speak in a very general way about “Pure 
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Land Buddhism,” and yet it was developed in a particular way by Hōnen 
Shōnin 法然上人 (1133–1212) in Japan. His disciples struck out in various 
religious directions; among them, Shinran Shōnin 親鸞聖人 (1173–1262) 
was particularly influential in inaugurating the Shin Buddhist interpretation 
of the nenbutsu 念仏. But this in turn was contested in some res pects, and as 
a consequence the Tannishō 歎異鈔 was written as an expres sion of regret 
over the appearance of divergences. Similarly, the followers of Nichiren 
Shōnin 日蓮聖人 (1222–1282) contested among themselves the true lines 
of interpretation and conse quently produced sub­denominations of various 
kinds. Apart from seeking to hold fast to the insights of their own preferred 
teachers, these forms of Buddhism also claimed to be representing the full 
meaning of the Dharma. At the same time, it is notable that Pure Land 
Buddhism, Shin Buddhism, and the Buddhism of the Lotus tradition have 
all been regarded by outsiders, including other Buddhists, as deviations 
from the main outline of Mahayana Buddhism. Here we must recall that 
the emergence of Mahayana Buddhism to begin with has been viewed with 
suspicion by modern proponents of the Theravada School. On the other 
hand, the early Mahayanists expressed themselves dialectically, and at first 
quite polemically, to bring out what they claimed was the real meaning of 
the teaching of the Buddha himself, of which others had lost sight. 
Thus, questions have frequently arisen within the overall Buddhist tradi­
tion about the discernment of true teaching or authentic practice. External, 
non­partisan observers can scarcely avoid remarking the variety of Bud­
dhist traditions although, in recent years at least, they usually try to avoid 
normative interventions regarding what may or may not be regarded as 
“authentic” Buddhism. Yet Buddhist actors themselves can hardly avoid 
adopting normative positions within the field, despite protestations of non-
discrimination or at least of the toleration of otherness.
There are many ways in which claims to a normative, authentic presenta­
tion of Dhamma/Dharma have been mounted or legitimized. Most of these 
ways turn on the attitude adopted towards the process of “transmission” 
for, if one seeks to present something as “the teaching of the Buddha” 
or, if emphasizing practice, “the way of the Buddha,” then the question 
will arise as to how this particular presentation is legitimized. Is reliable 
transmission effected with the help of words, or rather without words? Is it 
made possible by the acceptance of the authority of a previous teacher, or is 
it accepta ble for a gifted new leader to reach back through selected texts to 
a prior, essential version of the Dhamma/Dharma? Among all the Buddhist 
texts, how can it be decided which ones may be regarded as pre­eminent? 
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Can it be assumed that all the texts which are “accepted” in terms of the 
criteria proposed in the Pāli Mahāparinibbāna Sutta were or are authentic 
transmissions, thus creating what was much later called a “canon”? How 
can there be any such thing in Buddhism as an “apocryphal” text (on this 
tricky concept see further below)? Was it helpful to arrange the texts in 
a kind of hierarchy, as in the panjiao 判教 systems of early Chinese and 
Korean Buddhism? Or did it already make more sense, many centuries 
ago, to rely on a series of valid monastic ordinations and an authoritative 
transmission of “precepts” from country to country? Or was it better to 
go on a journey from Korea or Japan to China, or from China to India, in 
search of the true Dharma or its best possible forms of expression? What 
were the motivations and expectations of such specialised pilgrims in search 
of the real thing? And as their perception of the Dharma became clearer, 
was it conducive to good order in Buddhist life to propose a lineage of 
reception as a guarantee of authenticity, one which could even be referred to 
metaphorically as a “blood­line” (Jp. kechimyaku 血脈)? This is a common 
feature of several Buddhist traditions, but we must always remember that 
such a process, though appearing to be cumulative, can only take place 
retrospectively when contestation is involved. Not who are the patriarchs, 
but who can be claimed as belonging to the relevant, determi native chain of 
patriarchs? Such is the underlying question.
In recent years it has become more widely evident than ever before that 
religious authorities are themselves invented, constructed and defended by 
their followers. On the one hand, those with simple faith might regard that 
which is received as deriving straightforwardly from a powerful revelatory 
source, without asking any further about how such a source came to be 
established. Thoughtful believers however will have long noticed that it is 
above all later authorities who set up earlier ones. It is they who, looking 
back into the tradition, take decisions about which masters, which texts, 
which practices, which symbols or which rules should now be viewed as 
determinative. To use a phrase which has now become widely recognized, 
the tradition is “invented.”1 This allows those with a predilection for post­
modernism to emphasize the constructive agency of those who seek to 
posi tion themselves anew through a clever use of traditional themes. But 
such a perception by no means depends on post­modernist thought. On the 
contrary, it was distinctly argued by the early modern thinker Tominaga 
Nakamoto 富永仲基 (1715–1746) that the variety of denominational 
positions within the Buddhist stream can be explained precisely by the 
1 Cf. the well known work of Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983).
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fact that individuals often sought to supersede with a distinct profile their 
predecessors, or to supersede them. He named this procedure kajō 加上 
which literally means “adding” and “upping” and implies going one better 
than predecessors. Tominaga applied this concept, rather scornfully, to the 
competing genealogies constructed in the Zen schools, as in chapter 20 
of his remarkably precocious writing, the Shutsujōkōgo 出定後語 (literal 
meaning: “Words after Emerging from Meditation”).2
Very often, as we know, new authorities which emerge within a particular 
religion claim that they are presenting the key part of the tradition, its heart 
or essence, and that they are presenting it more accurately, more precisely, 
or more effectively. It is therefore not surprising that the term “essence,” or 
in German Wesen, has not infrequently been used in this connection. Suzuki 
Daisetsu used it, for example, in the title of his essay The Essence of Bud­
dhism.3 The influence of the German usage on English and other languages 
has been considerable. It should be noted that the term Wesen was used 
in the nineteenth century and thereafter both for “the essence of religion” 
(Ludwig Feuerbach, Friedrich Schleiermacher) and for “the essence of 
Christianity” (Adolf von Harnack, Alfred Loisy, Ernst Troeltsch), and of 
course these two questions, or searches, should not be confused. We are 
concerned here however with Buddhism, and it is inter esting to see how 
the widely referenced work by Edward Conze, Buddhism: Its Essence and 
Development 4 both transports the concept from German and applies it to 
the Buddhist tradition. However, this is not just a German or European 
way of thinking. Highly relevant concepts in East Asian Bud dhism include 
“the great meaning” (dayi 大意, Jp. daii) as used in the Platform Sutra of 
Huineng 慧能 (638–713), and the daigo 醍醐 familiar from the name of the 
Shingon temple Daigoji in Kyoto, which means the ghee, or the gist. We 
even find the expression “the ghee of the ghee” which can be compared to 
the English expression “quintessence.”
Nowadays historians of religion often prefer to avoid such terms in case 
they are themselves suspected of having some kind of normative agenda up 
their sleeve. So is it still appropriate to use the term “essence” in this con­
nection at all? This depends on who is using it. For historians of religion it 
may prove to be a trap, for they are supposed to avoid making normative 
2 Tominaga 1990.
3 Suzuki 1948. Another example is Fujimoto Keimei’s Shin Buddhism’s Essence: The 
Tannisho (1993). In fact this title illustrates the persistent attraction of this term for later 
generations, since the original title of this publication some sixty years earlier in 1932 did 
not contain it at all, having been simply The Tannisho; A Religion Beyond Good and Evil.
4 Conze 1951, and later editions.
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judgments. On the other hand, the authorities speaking on behalf of a 
religious community or denomination are speaking normatively. Unlike the 
mere historian on the sidelines, they are speaking with authority. It is their 
very real function to tell their followers what the tradition is about, what the 
key points are, what in their judgment the essence really is.5
A feature of such discussions in the field of Buddhist Studies is the 
modern use by scholars of the term “apocryphal,” a term that has become 
widespread, but can in fact be quite misleading. In other cultural contexts 
it has usually been employed to refer to writings which are fictitiously 
ascribed to an esteemed author, as in the phrase “apocryphal gospels,” 
which are piously but unrealistically attributed to apostles. This usually 
implies that, by contrast, the four canonical Gospels of the New Testament 
really were written by those to whom they are ascribed, although in fact 
such ascriptions are also of tentative value only. By analogy, Buddhist 
sutras, with their famous opening phrase “Thus I have heard,” are presented 
as having emanated directly from the mouth of the Buddha himself, while 
somehow suggesting that if this is manifestly not so, these texts would 
count as inauthentic. Since the Buddha did not speak Chinese, any sutras 
extant only in that language are therefore suspected of being “apocryphal.” 
Conse quently, in Buddhist studies the word has sometimes come to mean 
simply “not of Indian origin.” The weakness of any such categorisation is 
that the sutras in Indian languages themselves cannot simply be presumed 
to have emanated in Pāli and in Sanskrit, as the texts which they now are, 
from the mouth of the Buddha. To pose this problem directly as a chal­
lenging question: which Indian sutras are themselves not apocryphal? There 
is a presumed priority for early Indian Buddhism, which is of course not 
without some justice. Thus there is a historical sequence, but the use of the 
word “apocryphal” can easily be twisted into, or hide, a dogmatic assump­
tion about the antiquity or authority of Indian texts which is itself without 
historical foundation. This is an example of how a normative concept can 
creep into historical work in a manner which fails to do justice to the real 
features of the tradition.6
Returning to our main theme, what we have before us therefore is a 
number of questions about the nature of religious authority, the relation­
ships between origins and later developments, and the consistency of trans­
5 An early comparative study of these matters may be found in Pye and Morgan 1973.
6 This is not the place to enter into a full discussion of this problem, which has been 
approached recently by Buswell (1990), Nattier (1992), and others.
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mission. Such questions arise in the case of Buddhism just as much as in 
any other religion. How do the representatives of various standpoints within 
the tradition as a whole deal with these questions? Is it somehow possible 
to identify the main characteristics of a particular religious tradition? How 
is “authority” perceived? How is consistency assessed? How is a reliable 
transmission assured? In the present issue of The Eastern Buddhist we pre­
sent several case studies that address such questions as they arise in the 
field of Buddhist studies. It is in no sense a comprehensive survey, for in a 
field so complex that could scarcely be achieved. However we believe that 
in their diversity the articles included in this issue illustrate some of these 
matters rather well. They explore a number of the options which have been 
adopted as Buddhists have come to terms with the strains and stresses of 
transmission.
We begin with an article by Max Deeg entitled “Chinese Buddhists in 
Search of Authenticity in the Dharma,” which shows us how Buddhist trav­
elers to India sought reliable threads of transmission. Being “in search of 
authenticity,” their journeys may certainly be thought of as pilgrimages, 
even though the routes were newly forged. Deeg shows us how this process 
created a sense of certainty among Chinese Buddhists which enabled them 
to claim a new authenticity of their own.
Early Japanese Buddhists had a formidable task in the search for an 
authentic transmission of the Dharma, and indeed of the vinaya. There was 
scarcely any question of direct transmission from India to that easternmost 
country which lay beyond China and Korea. Given various intermediaries, 
there was inevitably tension and competition among all who sought and 
claimed the true transmission. In his article “The Eastward Flow of Bud­
dhism and its Waterspouts, Springs, and Countercurrents: Ordinations and 
Precepts,” Paul Groner guides us through these stormy seas, centering his 
analysis on the Tendai 天台 story, but also looking far beyond it to the trans­
missions of our own times.
We follow these central themes with two fascinating accounts of quite 
different modes of transmission in the context of Zen and Shingon Bud­
dhism respectively. For the concept of Dharma transmission in Zen Bud­
dhism, well known for its genealogies, we are very fortunate to have an 
account of the work of Yamakawa Aki of the Kyoto National Museum. For 
many years she has been researching the carefully preserved robes of the 
Zen masters of the temple Tōfukuji 東福寺 in Kyoto. What emerges in her 
article “Five Dharma Transmission Robes at the Zen Temple Tōfukuji” is a 
technically impressive picture of the great care with which the transmission 
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of Zen has been documented in fabric and carefully preserved in the form 
of authoritative objects. In the field of Shingon, on the other hand, another 
special mechanism has been at work, namely the authority of oracular pro­
nouncement. This form seems to allow for revelatory interjections which are 
nevertheless bound into a coherent legitimizing Buddhist culture. Elizabeth 
Tinsley’s fascinating and immensely detailed study “Indi rect Transmission 
in Shingon Buddhism: Notes on the Henmyōin Oracle” provides insight 
into a chain of thought and practice whose dynamics are for the most part 
not easily visible.
We then turn to the way in which authoritative transmission came to be 
articulated, retrospectively, in Shin Buddhism. Michael Conway explores 
very sensitively how each link in this chain was selected and built up. The 
process had already begun in the thought of the Chinese promoters of faith 
in Amida Buddha, was continued by Genshin 源信 (942–1017) and Hōnen 
in Japan, and then found its fullest expression in the thought of Shinran. The 
latter gave it a popular literary form in his Kōsō wasan 高僧和讃 (Hymns on 
the Patriarchs) as well as in the more widely used Shōshinge 正信偈 (Hymn 
on True Awakening). Here, therefore, we see a third way in which tradition 
has been invented in Buddhism. Those familiar with temple arrangements 
in Japan will be aware that the seven patriarchs or “high monks” (kōsō) 
are regularly presented to one side of a central figure of Amida Nyorai 阿
弥陀如来, usually being depicted on a hanging scroll, and thus providing a 
devotional focus for this particular configuration of the tradition.
Following these alternative approaches in Zen, Shingon and Shin Bud­
dhism, we turn our attention back to the role of the vinaya in determining 
the identity of Buddhism. Failing doctrinal consensus, it may seem that 
the obvious place to look for consistency in Buddhist transmission is 
in the vinaya; this view was certainly maintained by King Mongkut of 
Thailand when he sought to reform Buddhism in his country in the nine­
teenth century. As is well known, he required new, but valid ordinations, 
and arranged for these to take place on a new ordination platform floating 
on water so that they would not fall under the jurisdiction of existing insti­
tutions. In Japan, the introduction of the vinaya by the famous Chinese 
monk Jianzhen 鑑真 (Jp. Ganjin) is a relatively uncomplicated piece of Bud­
dhist history. Here however we have two contributions on the role of the 
vinaya in the establishment of Korean Buddhism, which was, and still is 
perceived in various contestable ways.
In the first instance we read in the article by Richard D. McBride about 
the contestation of vinaya transmission in the early period of Korean Bud­
dhism. Three distinct narratives are analysed, each centering on a different 
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monastic figure who was claimed to have distinct access to valid tradition. 
One of these, Tanshi 曇始 (fl. ca. 376–450), was a Chinese missionary 
to Korea; the second was the Korean Chajang 慈藏 (d. between 650 and 
655) who received the vinaya from Daoxuan 道宣 (596–667) in China; a 
third was the chronologically prior Korean monk Kyŏmik 謙益 (fl. 526) 
who was said to have gone to India himself to claim an authentic tradition 
from beyond China. The analysis is complicated by the wish of some 
modern Korean scholars to establish a connection with tradition that is both 
independent of China and more ancient than that of Japan. The problem is 
revisited in the modern era by Ja­rang Lee, who writes on the wrangles over 
the substance of the Four-part Vinaya in the Chogye 曹溪 denomination 
during recent decades. At first the Four-part Vinaya was adduced to 
reconstitute a celibate and vegetarian sangha, overturning regu lations 
imposed under colonial Japanese rule. Next came an attempt to adapt the 
vinaya by means of a number of specific rules and regulations which took 
some account of what had become customary in modern life. However, 
since these regulations followed the direction of secular law and secular 
morality, the result was a considerable relaxation of the rules. With their 
ordained persons found to be gambling and drinking, the Chogye order fell 
into some disrepute. A reaction therefore set in which sought to get closer to 
the original vinaya with the help of new regulations called the “Pure Rules,” 
but even these show a tendency to follow worldly norms; for example those 
who have been monks for longer are allowed to use larger cars. The question 
remains contested therefore as to whether, and if so how, the early Four-part 
Vinaya can be re­applied in modern times to secure continuity with the past.
In sum, the underlying themes addressed in these various papers emerge 
in remarkably different ways at different times, and in the context of quite 
varied symbolic worlds. Within Japan alone, there is more diversity within 
the various broad schools than is often noticed; this applies very evidently 
to Zen traditions in ways that go significantly beyond the specific example 
we have been able to include in this issue. Moreover, diverse and competing 
chains of authority are also retrospectively created in the rather numerous 
Lotus traditions driven by the thought of Nichiren. While it might be 
imagined that such diversity could lead to indifference and a lack of interest 
in claims to authenticity and authority, this does not in fact usually seem to 
be the case. “Buddhism” wants to be “Buddhism” even while the authority 
of particular claims and accentuations within the presumed parameters of 
that “Buddhism” is usually carefully guarded and asserted. This in turn 
justifies the promotion and the further development of particular narratives 
within the Buddhist family.
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